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The 2001 Nobel Prize in economic sciences was awarded to George Akerlof, Michael Spence and 
Joseph Stiglitz for their work during the preceding 30 years on ‘analyses of markets with 
asymmetric information’. Their work covers a diverse range of issues including adverse selection, 
signalling theory, and the screening of participants in markets http://nobelprize.org/ Environment 
practitioners are likely to find plenty to agree with in Joseph Stiglitz’s Nobel acceptance speech, 
particularly his comment that … “Information imperfections are pervasive in the economy: indeed it 
is hard to imagine what a world of perfect information would be like.” Stiglitz, 2002, p.469. In his 
speech he expounded his view that a paradigm change had occurred in economics and there was 
widespread recognition of the ways information effects behaviour and decision-making. 
 
EIANZ in 2007 released a blueprint for environmental practitioners entitled ‘Meeting the Challenges 
of the Future’. Three sets of actions were listed as forming the basis for the Blueprint, including – 
‘Improve the communication of information about the environment’. This would not have surprised 
many EIANZ members as information is a fundamental requirement to enable good decisions on 
any issue, and better communication of information is essential for informed debate. 
 
Strenuous efforts are often applied to generating and assembling information to enable or support 
decision making.  In New Zealand EIA studies, s.32 reports, s42 assessment of environmental 
effects and doubtless many other reports are completed to aid decision making. These major 
efforts to generate information by highly skilled professionals undoubtedly aid decision-makers, but 
provide no assurance that decisions reached are beyond criticism. I suggest there are a couple of 
reasons why despite those lengthy, costly efforts, environmental outcomes may be less than 
perfect. Current debate over water allocation and use can be considered to illustrate the point.  
 
A recent workshop debated if there is a need for a central clearing house for information on water. 
At least one person commented that it is important to distinguish between data, information and 
uptake of information. Data and information on water quantity, quality and use, it was asserted, is 
not lacking. Arguably there is also plenty of public interest in making use of the data and 
information that is available and communicated via various media. If those views are correct, then 
explanation for the widespread debate over water allocation and its use must be sought elsewhere. 
An alternative explanation is there is a paucity of information on the value of water in alternative 
uses, and this vacuum allows poorly informed comment to thrive. Markets for water are as yet 
embryonic in New Zealand. Individuals or firms who wish to purchase water rights in most case 
have to purchase a farm. Prices - a versatile indicator of value, are rarely visible to observers, who 
include environmental professionals. In the absence of information on the value of water that 
employs a common metric such as dollars, or of water prices, decision making on water allocation 
seems an unenviably challenging task, and public debate unsurprisingly contentious. 
 
Decision makers on water allocation can of course request information on the value of water, and 
as noted earlier, strenuous efforrts are appplied to that end. However, generating useful 
information requires first asking the right questions. If the issue is how to allocate water in a way 
that assures us net benefits to society are maximised, information is needed on the benefits that 
can be gained from alternative potential uses of water. If  there are competing uses for water – for 
instream habitat, recreation, hydro power, irrrigation, municipal, stock water – then use of water for 
any of those purposes has an opportunity  cost. First in first served allocation processes coupled 
with absence of any charges for use of water negate concern over opportunity cost. Decision 
making processes that are not alerted to opportunity cost are likely to gain a false impression of the 
net benefits to be derived from a specific use of water.   
 
Greater use of water markets would mean more information would be available on the value of 
water in some uses and would contribute to better informed debate. Greater recognition of the 
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